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Abstract: Although there has been considerable recent debate on the topic of adversariality in argumentation, this 
debate has rarely found its way into work on critical thinking theory and instruction. This paper focuses on the 
implications of the adversariality debate for teaching critical thinking. Is there a role for adversarial argumentation in 
critical thinking instruction? Is there a way to incorporate the benefits of adversarial argumentation while mitigating 
the problems? 
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1. Introduction 
 
There has been considerable recent debate on the topic of adversariality in argumentation. On the 
one hand, it has been argued that argumentation is, by its nature, adversarial in that it involves a 
confrontation between arguers arguing opposing positions, and, further, that such a confrontation 
of opposing views is essential for arriving at the best judgments. On the other hand, some 
theorists have pointed out that such an adversarial framing can be problematic in terms of 
encouraging aggressive modes of discourse that can interfere with rational exchange. In addition, 
the imperative to win that is inherent in adversarial argumentation may well eclipse the goal of 
coming to a reasoned judgment, undermining co-operation, open-mindedness, and a willingness 
to concede to the strongest reasons. 
 Although there has been a growing interest in adversariality in argumentation theory, this 
debate has rarely found its way into work on critical thinking theory and instruction.1 The issue 
 
1 One work which does deal with the issue of adversariality in critical thinking instruction is Catherine Hundleby’s 
(2010) discussion of problems with the adversary paradigm in the teaching of fallacies. 
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addressed in this paper is: how does this debate apply to critical thinking? Is there a role for 
adversariality and adversarial argumentation in education for critical thinking? 
 
2. The educational project 
 
In order to tackle the issue of the role of adversariality in critical thinking instruction, it is 
necessary, first, to establish what the goals are of critical thinking instruction. We have argued 
elsewhere (Bailin & Battersby 2016a) that the primary goal of critical thinking instruction should 
be to develop in people the ability and the habits of mind or virtues relevant to making reasoned 
judgments on significant issues, often of a complex nature, and to engage in reasoned 
interchange and dialogue. 
 There are a number of contexts in which this goal is central: 
i) individual inquiry and decision-making: making judgments and decisions about issues and 
controversies which people encounter, for example political issues (Should our country accept 
more refugee claimants? For whom shall I vote?); social issues (Should there be physician-
assisted dying? Should assault rifles be banned?); scientific issues (Should you have your 
children vaccinated? Is GMO food safe?). This would include making judgments about 
arguments one reads and written back and forth argumentation. 
ii) group deliberation: engaging in deliberation and making judgments and decisions in group 
situations, for example in juries and in educational, professional and community contexts  
iii) persuasion: in person argumentation between two or more individuals trying to persuade the 
others of the rightness of their position.  
 All these contexts require the capacity to critically evaluate reasons and arguments on 
various sides of issues as well as the habits of mind or virtues necessary for doing so in an open-
minded and fair-minded way. In addition, cases ii) and iii) require the ability and propensity to 
engage in rational and productive dialogue, to make a reasonable case with the appropriate level 
of confidence, to listen to the arguments of others, and to modify or change one’s position when 
warranted by the arguments. All these contexts involve a consideration of conflicting views. 
Thus questions regarding the role of adversariality are relevant to all of them. 
 
3. The adversariality debate 
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3.1 Pro adversariality 
 
3.1.1 Argumentation is by its nature adversarial 
Theorists on one side of the debate argue that argumentation is by its nature adversarial in that it 
involves a confrontation between arguers arguing opposing positions (Govier 1999). As Govier 
states:  
 
It would appear that in any controversy there must be proponents and opponents of various 
views. Insofar as we are engaged in a controversy, we will be arguing with others who 
disagree with us and are, in that sense at least, our opponents or antagonists (p. 247). 
  
Govier further claims that argumentation involves the belief that the opposing position is 
mistaken and that this, in turn, entails the belief that the person holding the opposing position is 
wrong, and that, with respect to the correctness of the position, they are one’s opponent (Govier 
1999, p. 244). Aikin (in a 2011 paper) supports this oppositional framing, maintaining that we 
argue with others because we believe that our views are correct and theirs are not and that those 
who disagree with our views are wrong and need correction (Aikin, 2011). Indeed, numerous 
theorists have pointed out the ubiquity of this adversarial paradigm in philosophy (Moulton 
1983) and in argumentation more generally (Cohen 2015). Casting the participants in 
argumentation in the roles of proponent and opponent with the goal of prevailing in the argument 
is a common way of framing the practice. 
 
3.1.2 Epistemic advantages of adversariality 
The argument is not, however, simply that argumentation is, by nature, an adversarial practice. It 
is argued, further, that this adversarial practice has epistemic advantages – that  such a 
confrontation of opposing views is essential for arriving at the best judgments. Zarefsky, for 
example, argues that the prospect of prevailing in an argument motivates people to produce 
stronger reasons than they would on their own (Zarefsky 2012). And Aikin makes the point thus: 
 
 4 
it is in the enacting of the debates, the attempts by each side’s proponents to make the best 
case, rebut the opponent’s counter-arguments, and lay out the best criticisms of the 
alternatives that we gain an understanding of an issue (Aikin 2011, p. 260). 
 
 The argument is that the rigorous debate at the heart of adversarial argumentation results 
in the laying out for consideration of the best case for opposing views, the strongest objections 
and counter-arguments, and the most forceful rebuttals. This makes it more likely that the best 
supported view will prevail. 
 There is, in fact, considerable support for the view that the consideration of alternative 
views and opposing arguments is crucial for coming to reasoned judgments (Finocchiaro 1994; 
Perkins 1989; Perkins et al. 1983). Such a consideration of alternatives is important because fully 
evaluating a theory or view is a comparative enterprise, requiring the weighing of evidence and 
arguments for and against the various alternative views (Kuhn, 1991; Bailin & Battersby, 2009, 
2016a). Evaluation, as Kuhn argues, is meaningful only in a framework of comparison (pp. 266-
267). In this context, the generation of counter-examples and counter-arguments is indispensable 
as it plays a crucial role in the evaluating of one’s own views in comparison with alternative 
views and allows for the revision of existing beliefs (Kuhn 1991). Kuhn again: “Paradoxically, to 
know that a theory is correct entails the ability to envision and address claims that it may not be” 
(p. 171). 
 There is also considerable evidence, however, that individuals, on their own, are 
generally not very good at generating opposing arguments and considering opposing views. 
Much current research in cognitive psychology has demonstrated the ubiquity of myside bias, 
involving a failure to consider alternatives and to fairly and adequately evaluate arguments with 
which one disagrees (Perkins, 1989; Perkins, Farady, & Bushey 1991; Perkins & Tishman 2001; 
Stanovich 2011). It appears that people are generally much better at evaluating and critiquing the 
arguments of others than they are at evaluating their own reasoning. They tend, for example, to 
have a limited ability to come  up with arguments against positions that they hold and in 
generating counter-examples to their own views (Mercier 2016; Mercier & Sperber 2017): 
 
When people reason on their own, they mostly find reasons that support their preexisting 
beliefs (myside bias), and they are not critical toward these reasons (laziness). As a result, 
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they are unlikely to revise their own beliefs, whether or not these beliefs are accurate 
(Mercier, Boudry, Paglieri & Trouche 2017, p. 6). 
 
It is through the practice of argumentation, however, that these tendencies can be countered. 
 
Thanks to reasoning, senders can provide arguments to support their messages, arguments 
that can be evaluated by receivers so they can decide whether to accept the message. By 
discussing and evaluating one another’s arguments, people may end up accepting a point of 
view that they initially deemed implausible or unpalatable (Lombardi, Nussbaum, & 
Sinatra 2015). (Mercier, Boudry, Paglieri & Trouche 2017, p. 5). 
 
 The epistemic benefits of argumentation are borne out by the success of some forms of 
group deliberation. Groups, properly constituted, tend to be much better at making reasoned 
judgments than individuals, group members compensating for each other’s limitations and 
correcting each other’s cognitive biases (Mercier 2016; Mercier & Sperber 2017). Such benefits 
only accrue in groups in which there is a confrontation of conflicting views and in which 
participants feel free to express those views and critique the views of others. Group deliberation 
in which there is a lack of disagreement or a reluctance to express differing views can result in 
the amplification of errors, the reinforcement of existing beliefs, and an increase in commitment 
to poor decisions (Janis1982; Schultz-Hardt et al. 2000, 2006; Sunstein & Hastie 2015). 
 What the pro adversariality view rightly highlights is the epistemic value of disagreement 
and the importance of mutual critique. 
 
3.2 Problems of Adversariality 
 
3.2.1 Aggressive modes of discourse 
The adversarial framing of argumentation also presents some risks, however. One of these relates 
to the modes of discourse it encourages. Numerous theorists have criticized the dominance of 
battle and sports metaphors in argumentation and the type of aggressive discourse which it can 
engender (Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Blair 1987; Moulton 1989; Ayim 1991; Cohen 1995; Govier 
1999; Rooney 2010; Hundleby 2013). These modes of discourse may exclude women and 
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socially marginalized groups (Moulton 1989, Ayim 1991, Tannen 1998) and can interfere with 
reasonable and productive interactions and with rational exchange (Hundleby 2013, p. 240). 
 It has been argued, however that adversarial argumentation need not result in aggressive 
modes of interaction. Govier refers to such behaviours as ancillary adversariality and suggests 
that it is not a necessary part of argumentation. Adversariality can, she argues, be kept to a 
logical and polite minimum (Govier 1999), a type of adversariality which she calls minimal 
adversariality. 
 
3.2.2 Oppositional framing 
The proposal for minimal adversariality, although it does address the issue of aggressive 
language and modes of interacting, is nonetheless problematic in accepting the framing of the 
enterprise in terms of opponents and winning. Govier states, for example, “When we argue for a 
claim, we at the same time, and necessarily, argue against an envisioned opponent, one who does 
not accept the claim” (p. 243). 
 This slide from “arguing for claims” to “arguing against people who disagree with those 
claims” is problematic. Moreover, viewing the person holding the opposing position as one’s 
opponent is unnecessary and unjustified, as Rooney points out: “[W]hy are you my “opponent” if 
you are providing me with further or alternative considerations in regard to X . . . whether I end 
up agreeing with X or not-X?” (Rooney 2010, p. 221). 
 Govier herself, in fact, recognizes the difficulty inherent in this oppositional terminology: 
 
If we accept that there is a positive value in controversy . . . then what reason is there to 
regard those who participate with us in controversy as opponents or antagonists with whom 
we are in conflict? Given all the positive aspects of controversy, there is an important sense 
in which such people are helping us by disagreeing with us. Thus we might wish to regard 
them as partners, not opponents (p. 254). 
 
 A related issue has to do with the effect of this contest metaphor on the goal of epistemic 
improvement. We have seen the argument made by some theorists (Aikin 2011, Zarefsky 2012) 
that adversariality, with its accompanying desire to win the argument, contributes to epistemic 
goals. Yet in practice the opposite result is often the case. The imperative to win the argument 
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may conflict with the desire to have the best view win out, thereby eclipsing the goal of coming 
to a reasoned judgment, undermining co-operation, open-minded consideration of opposing 
arguments, and a willingness to concede to the strongest reasons and to revise or change one’s 
view if warranted by the evidence. 
 If the argument is that having each party make the strongest case they can for their own 
position will result in epistemic advance, then the question arises: to whom do the epistemic 
gains accrue? If each of the arguers is committed to winning rather than to making a reasoned 
judgment, then it would fall to a third party or parties (an audience) to evaluate the arguments 
and make the reasoned judgment (as is the case in a courtroom or traditional debate). Unless the 
arguers are open to a fair-minded consideration of the opposing views and are willing to revise or 
change their position if warranted, the epistemic gains will not accrue to them. 
 In this context, Rooney has pointed out that the framing of the argumentative enterprise 
in terms of winning and losing is, in fact, an inaccurate and misleading description. If our 
interlocutor offers a better argument for their position than we offer for ours and we accept that 
argument, we don’t in fact lose. We actually gain. We are, epistemically speaking, better for it. 
 Another problem with the adversariality view is its binary framing of argumentation. 
Cohen maintains that such a framing can interfere with our rational goals since it tends to 
presuppose that: 
 
the subject at hand can be carved into distinct and opposing positions, and this tends to 
squeeze the discussion of even the most complex questions into a black-and-white view of 
the world (Cohen 1995, pp. 180-181). 
 
Argumentation is not, however, a binary affair. Argumentation is dialectical, involving an 
interaction between arguers and arguments. Particular arguments are often modified or reframed 
in response to criticism and objections, and these modifications may in turn result in a revision of 
the objections, a modification of the criteria deemed relevant, and even a reframing of the 
original question (Bailin & Battersby 2009). The kind of richer, deeper understanding of an issue 
which can come out of a confrontation of views is less likely to arise when such a dialectical 
dimension is lacking. 
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 The paradigm of argumentation which is the focus of the adversariality debate tends to be 
two persons face to face persuasive argumentation. In practice, however, argumentation takes 
place in a variety of other contexts and is structured in various ways, from formally structured 
contexts such as traditional debates and courtroom argumentation, to an individual deliberating 
about an issue, several people inquiring together in a collaborative group, and individuals with 
differing views trying to make a judgment. 
 It is important to keep in mind, however, that, regardless of how argumentation may be 
structured in particular contexts, the underlying goal is the making of reasoned judgments. There 
are variations in how this goal is cashed out by different theorists -- to yield knowledge or 
reasonable belief (Biro and Siegel 1997, 2006), to lead to rationally justified belief (Lumer 
2005), the bettering of our belief systems (van Radziewsky 2013), epistemic betterment (Stevens 
& Cohen 2019). We prefer to characterize this goal in terms of coming to reasoned judgments, 
making it clear that this includes judgments about what to do as well as about what to believe 
(Bailin & Battersby 2009, 2016a). Arguers may come to an argument with various initial 
intentions including, but not limited to, wanting to persuade their interlocutor of a different view. 
But so long as they are engaging in a reasoned exchange of arguments, are open to seriously 
considering alternative arguments, and are willing to follow the reasoning where it leads and to 
alter their own position accordingly, they are involved in a joint endeavour and are not opponents 
(Bailin & Battersby 2009, 2016b). 
 
3.2.3 Polarization 
Another potential risk posed by adversarial argumentation is polarization. Although the 
confrontation of conflicting views can result in the serious consideration of opposing views and 
counter-arguments and can enhance the making of reasoned judgments, it does not always reap 
such epistemic benefits. The problem is not simply that individuals are often unmoved by cogent 
opposing arguments and counter-arguments (Lord, Ross & Lepper 1979. The process of 
defending one’s position against counter-arguments and counter-evidence often creates a 
backfire effect, with individuals becoming even more entrenched in their original positions 
(Lord, Ross & Lepper 1979; Sloman & Fernbach 2017; Kahan 2013; Bai et al. 2018). One 
possible explanation for this phenomenon is in terms of defensive bias: people tend to identify 
with their beliefs and so are motivated to protect their beliefs as a way of protecting their feelings 
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of adequacy and self-worth (Cohen, Bastardi, Sherman, McGoey & Ross 2007; Sherman & 
Cohen 2002). 
 Another explanation is in terms of cultural cognition which involves individuals holding 
onto specific beliefs as a way of expressing their group identity and solidarity with others and so 
resisting information and evidence that go against the dominant beliefs within their group (van 
Bavel & Pereira 2018; Kahan 2013; Kahan, Jenkins-Smith & Braman 2011). The framing of 
those who hold opposing views as one’s opponent, as, indeed, the “enemy” is an all too common 
manifestation of this problem. And it is a problem which occurs not only in face-to-face 
argumentation but also when people hear, read, or come across arguments (e.g., in the media) 
which disagree with the views they hold. Indeed, Haidt has argued that it is virtually impossible 
to persuade others under conditions of group competition (Haidt 2012) . 
 
4. What can we learn from the debate? 
 
There are a number of lessons that can be learned from the discussion of adversariality that are 
applicable to education for critical thinking. The debate reveals some aspects of adversarial 
argument that contribute to epistemic improvement and that should be included in critical 
thinking instruction as well as some aspects that can detract from the making of reasoned 
judgments and that should be avoided. 
 
4.1 Positive aspects  
One of the most important points to be taken from the debate is the centrality of the exposure to 
opposing views for making reasoned judgments. The confrontation of conflicting views can help 
counteract myside bias, helping people to see both sides of an issue, to acknowledge counter-
arguments, and to make better arguments and improved judgments and decisions (Mercier & 
Sperber 2017, p. 298). The debate also highlights the importance of getting actual, strong, and 
not straw-person versions of these opposing views laid out for consideration. 
 Another lesson from the debate is the importance of critique. Given that we are generally 
not very good at evaluating our own views, the evaluation of our arguments by “other minds” is 
invaluable. The need to be accountable for our arguments can provide a motivation for exploring 
criticisms and counter-arguments and for improving our own reasoning (Tetlock 1992). 
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4.2 Negative aspects 
There are a number of aspects of adversariality that need to be avoided, however. One of these is 
the aggressive modes of discourse and of interacting that can accompany adversarial 
argumentation (Govier’s ancillary adversariality). These have been aptly criticized by numerous 
theorists as having no role in reasoned argumentation. 
 Also to be avoided is the focus on winning which is often a part of adversarial 
argumentation and which can detract from a fair-minded consideration of opposing views. This 
focus can engender or be accompanied by aggressive modes of discourse and interaction, but it 
need not be, as Govier points out. What is required, instead, is an orientation which focuses on 
the epistemic goals of argumentation, an approach which has as its goal reasoned judgments. 
 We also need to try to avoid or mitigate the kind of polarization and backfire effect which 
can occur when individuals confront views which conflict with their own. What is required is an 
approach which mitigates defensiveness in the face of challenges to one’s views and lessens the 
effects of in-group identity on reasoning. 
 
5. Adversariality and critical thinking instruction 
 
The goal for critical thinking education is to incorporate the benefits of adversarial 
argumentation while mitigating the problems. What is required, then, is an approach which 
encourages the confrontation of opposing views but at the same time fosters an open-minded 
consideration of these views. 
 The distinctions made by Stevens and Cohen (2019b) among several forms of 
adversariality is helpful here. They distinguish between the adversarial attitude, the adversarial 
stance, and the adversarial function. The adversarial attitude involves a focus on winning and 
garnering any practical advantages that winning can provide, rather than on “getting it right” and 
generating epistemic gains. The adversarial stance involves occupying roles that set people 
against each other as adversaries or opponents, e.g., in law, politics, debates. The adversarial 
function involving engaging in the ‘moves of critical probing’ (or task, as we have called them) 
(Bailin & Battersby 2016b) that are dialectically oppositional (Aikin 2017) and that are 
necessary for argumentation, for example formulating objections, raising questions. What is 
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desirable is an approach to critical thinking education that avoids the adversarial attitude but 
incorporates the adversarial function. We will address the role of the adversarial stance later. 
 
5.1 Dialectical Inquiry 
Our response is an approach based on what we call dialectical inquiry. It is an approach which 
focuses on a confrontation of opposing views but within a collaborative framework. In dialectical 
inquiry, the goal is to come to a reasoned judgment on a controversial issue and this is viewed as 
an essentially dialectical and collaborative process. Students work in groups to comparatively 
evaluate arguments on all sides of an issue rather than simply offering and defending their own 
arguments. Thus the exploration of conflicting views is at the centre of the inquiry process, but 
the process of reaching a reasoned judgment is a collaborative rather than adversarial endeavour.  
 There are a  number of features of dialectical inquiry which instantiate the desired 
elements described above. First, aspects of the structure of the inquiry process ensure an 
exposure to conflicting views. These include the requirement that students research the actual 
arguments that have been presented on various of issues and not just those that they can think of 
on their own nor straw-person versions that may have been offered by opponents of the view. A 
useful heuristic in this regard is a dialectical argument table which represents the debate on the 
issue, including the arguments pro and con as well as objections to the arguments and responses 
to the objections. Through learning epistemic norms as well as considering the context of the 
debate, students are in a position to come to  a reasoned judgment through a comparative 
evaluation of the relative strengths of the various arguments in the overall case. 
 Critique and the evaluation of one’s views and arguments by others are facilitated 
through group deliberation and feedback. Indeed, the use of groups is an important aspect of the 
approach. Students frequently engage in group interaction, discussing, questioning, challenging, 
and critiquing. They engage in collaborative inquiries, jointly researching, evaluating, debating, 
and coming to a joint judgment. They also engage in individual inquiries in which they conduct 
the inquiry in stages, working in groups to get critique from peers at each stage. The discussion 
and critique inherent in this process means that students will be exposed to objections to their 
positions and critiques of their arguments. They will also become accustomed to offering well-
grounded and rigourous critiques of the views of others. Strategies for further promoting the 
inclusion of conflicting views within the groups include creating heterogeneous groups, devil’s 
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advocacy (which can be effective although it tends to be less effective than real disagreement) 
(Schulz-Hardt, Jochims, and Frey 2002; Schulz-Hardt et al. 2006), and structured controversy 
(where students alternate in defending different sides of an issue and then collectively come to a 
reasoned judgment) (Johnson & Johnson 1988, 2009). The use of both devil’s advocacy and 
structured controversy can be seen as ways of injecting a temporary adversarial stance into the 
argumentation to ensure that the adversarial function is fulfilled. This can be particularly helpful 
in the case of students who are reluctant to disagree with and critique the views of their peers. 
These strategies can be an effective method for helping to mitigate the pitfalls of adversariality in 
group argumentation (Johnson & Johnson 1988, 2009) while encouraging accountability for 
one’s arguments and ensuring that alternative views are given a full hearing and appropriate 
scrutiny.  
 It is not always possible, however, to have actual interlocutors and peer critics when 
confronting controversial issues in life, as Baumtrog (2017) has pointed out. Thus one of the 
aims is to  set conditions that will encourage students to internalize the inquiry orientation. The 
intention is that students will develop the habit of seeking out opposing arguments as well as 
objections and critiques, and of evaluating them in a rigourous but fair-minded manner even 
when reasoning alone, thus developing intellectual independence. In this regard, Mercier 
suggests that 
 
students should be taught how to create felicitous contexts for group discussion, thereby 
allowing them both to reap the benefits of their argumentative skills and to improve on 
their solitary reasoning skills (Mercier, Boundry et al. 2017, p. 1). 
 
According to Mercier, these felicitous conditions involve people in the group having different 
opinions, being able to voice these opinions, and feeling free to criticize one another’s opinions 
(Mercier et al., p. 8). 
 There is, in fact,  considerable evidence that the epistemic benefits of group deliberation 
carry over to the individual context. Kuhn, for example, found that  students who had engaged in 
argumentation with peers offered more complex arguments incorporating both sides of the issue 
when writing individual essays on a different topic than did students who had been reasoning on 
their own (Kuhn & Crowell 2011). They also demonstrated an increased capacity to anticipate 
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counter-arguments in  contexts when an interlocutor was not present and with respect to topics 
beyond those discussed in the group (Mercier, 2017, p. 11). 
 The creation of a community of inquiry in the critical thinking class has an important role 
to play in countering the adversarial attitude and in reducing polarization. This is a community in 
which the epistemic goals of argumentation and the essentially collaborative nature of the 
enterprise are emphasized. It is a community which instantiates the norms of critical inquiry, 
promoting rigorous but respectful critique, including of one’s own views, open-minded and fair- 
minded exchanges, and changing one’s mind when justified by the evidence and arguments. It is 
also a community committed to respectful treatment, meaningful participation, and productive 
interaction (Bailin & Battersby 2017). 
 Such a community can mitigate defensive biases in that it is a community in which value 
is placed not on supporting particular views but rather on being reasonable and in which students 
feel free to revise their views. A community of inquiry can also help to address the challenges 
posed by cultural cognition by creating a community of affiliation as an alternative to or counter-
balance to one’s cultural community. In a community of inquiry, group identity is constituted not 
by a commitment to specific beliefs but rather by adherence to the norms of rational inquiry. 
 A central point to be emphasized here is that critical thinking education aims not only to 
develop the capacities for critical judgment, but also, and importantly, to foster the virtues of 
inquiry. These include an appreciation of reason (Bailin & Battersby 2007), a commitment to 
reasoned discussion, and a commitment to rational belief and action (Siegel 1988). The 
collaborative, community orientation of the approach can work towards these aims. 
 
6. Critiques 
 
6.1 Doesn’t recognize virtuous adversariality 
There are a number of critiques of our approach which would like to address in order to better 
clarify our arguments and position. Stevens and Cohen (2019a) criticize our approach for its 
alleged “wholesale rejection of adversariality.” They characterize our view as maintaining that 
there is never any role for any form of adversariality in argumentation, that “each arguer in a 
cooperative argument shares in the responsibility for fulfilling every [argumentative] task” and 
that a virtuous arguer committed to the telos of epistemological betterment will “choose the 
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cooperative stance at each stage.” The view which they argue for, in contrast, is that arguments 
take place in a variety of forms and contexts and that, depending on the situation, an arguer can 
choose an adversarial rather than a cooperative stance out of argumentative virtue. 
 The claims they attribute to us, however, do not reflect our position. We explicitly make 
the distinction between a perspective which focuses on argumentation as a social practice, and an 
epistemological perspective, which focuses on the overall epistemic goals of argumentation. We 
acknowledge that there are many contexts in which argumentation takes place and numerous 
ways in which argumentation is structured in practice including formally structured contexts 
(e.g., courtroom, traditional debates), individuals trying to persuade others of their position (both 
in face to face and in written contexts, e.g., social media), an individual deliberating about an 
issue, several people inquiring together in a collaborative group, and individuals with differing 
views trying to make a judgment. But we do not say anything about what choices particular 
arguers make, or should make, in these various contexts or at different stages. Our focus is not on 
the particular argumentative moves that arguers may make in specific situations but rather on 
their overall orientation to the argumentative enterprise (although an epistemic, inquiry 
orientation would preclude some moves, e.g., knowingly offering fallacious arguments or not 
conceding strong points in one’s interlocutor’s arguments2). We would not disagree with their 
claim that “even the virtuous arguer can be justified in adopting some degree of adversariality 
because of the context of an argument and her role in it” (Stevens and Cohen 2019, p. 2) – as 
long as adversariality is meant in the sense of the adversarial function. Our point is that in all of 
contexts, what needs to be borne in mind is that the underlying goal is an epistemic one –arriving 
at a reasoned judgment (a point with which they do not seem to disagree). So, for example, in the 
case of trying to persuade another of one’s position, the interlocutors must be willing to 
acknowledge strong points in the other’s arguments and modify their view when warranted by 
the reasons and arguments. 
 Nor do we claim that “each arguer in a cooperative argument shares in the responsibility 
for fulfilling every task.” Rather, our argument is that the various argumentative tasks (e.g., 
proposing arguments, offering objections, proposing counter-arguments, evaluating arguments) 
 
2 Cf. Stevens and Cohen: “The attitude arguers have in an argument will impact their argumentative behavior. E.g., 
an arguer with a cooperative attitude will aim to act so that the arguers as a group will identify and correctly weigh 
reasons applicable to the issue. By contrast, an arguer with an adversarial attitude will behave in those ways she 
hopes will ultimately help her achieve her goal of winning.” (Stevens & Cohen 2019b). 
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may be performed by, shared among, and even switched between arguers depending on the 
context and the situation, but  that the division of labour is incidental from an epistemological 
perspective. 
 Moreover, their claim that we completely reject adversariality is misleading. Indeed, a 
central aspect of our approach is that it is centred around the confrontation of conflicting views. 
We do not reject what Stevens and Cohen have called the adversarial function. Rather, we have 
made it a central aspect of the approach.  
 One of the underlying challenges with respect to clearly outlining our position is 
terminological. Although we have argued for the importance of what Stevens and Cohen call the 
adversarial function, we have reservations about using the term adversariality for the approach 
we are advocating. Theorists have tried to modify it with various adjectives (e.g., minimal as 
opposed to ancillary adversariality, dialectical adversariality) to divest it of its negative 
connotations. But the need for such modifications reveals the essentially problematic character of 
the term in this context. We think that a better description of what we are advocating might be 
“collaborative oppositionality” – where oppositionality is used in the sense of “the state of being 
opposed by way of comparison or contrast.” This captures the confrontation of opposing views 
without the negative associations of the term adversariality and emphasizes the collaborative 
nature of the process. It is similar to what Aikin (2017) calls “minimal dialectical adversariality”  
but avoids the problems of adversariality and emphasizes the collaborative dimension.  
 
6.2 Collaborative argumentation an unachievable ideal 
The second critique by Stevens and Cohen that we want to address is that our goal of 
collaborative argumentation is an unachievable ideal (2019b). Although agreeing that a 
cooperative stance may be a normative ideal, they argue that the social context of argumentation, 
e.g., that arguers, ourselves included, are flawed and that contexts are full of complex 
contingencies, make this ideal unrealizable in practice. They claim that “humans are combative 
and ineradicably susceptible to adversarial attitudes” and that “when we argue, we argue with 
others who bring their own adversarial attitudes to arguments.” Because of these constraints and 
contingencies, the goal of collaborative argumentation is unachievable, and our offering it as an 
argumentative ideal is potentially harmful. 
 We certainly agree that the goal which we are putting forth, which we would characterize 
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in terms of collaborative oppositionality, is a an ideal, but we do not see this as a criticism of the 
approach. On the contrary, our interest is in education for critical thinking and education is, or 
should be, animated by ideals. Ideals are what we aspire to, with full knowledge that they can 
never be perfectly achieved. They provide the basis for the more proximate goals and give 
substance to the virtues that we are aiming to develop. So, for example, we may see honesty as 
an ideal to be aspired to and aim to foster the virtue of honesty in students even though we know 
that they will not be perfectly honest in their lives, that their ability to practice honesty will not 
entirely depend on them but will be affected by circumstances, and that they will encounter 
people who do not act honestly and will try to take advantage of their honesty. Nonetheless, I do 
not think we would see this as grounds for ceasing to see honesty as an ideal nor would we want 
to say that trying to foster the virtue of honesty is harmful. 
 Moreover, we find their claim that “humans are combative and ineradicably susceptible 
to adversarial attitudes” a rather sweeping and questionable generalization. There is evidence 
that some individuals prefer cooperative over adversarial argumentation (Nussbaum 2002). 
Moreover, the success of collaborative group argumentation and deliberation would seem to 
indicate that collaborative interaction can be fostered through appropriate group structures (i.e., 
groups where there is a confrontation of conflicting views and in which people feel free to 
criticize other’s views and to revise their own views) (Mercier et al. 2017). Such willingness to 
revise one’s views is discouraged by an adversarial framing. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In trying to draw implications from the adversariality debate for critical thinking instruction, it is 
important to note the differing focuses of two endeavours. The focus for the debate over 
adversariality has largely been on two person face to face argumentation over a range of subjects 
– from significant issues (e.g., whether to implement a carbon tax) to practical concerns (e.g., 
who should walk the dog) -- and on how people conduct and should conduct such arguments. 
Our interest, in contrast, is on education for critical thinking. Thus our focus is on developing in 
students the argumentation skills necessary for making reasoned judgments rather than on the 
particular argumentative moves which arguers make in face to face argumentation. Our focus is 
broader in including solitary reasoning and group deliberation – both of which are largely 
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ignored or minimized in the debate. But it is also narrower in concentrating on contexts 
involving making reasoned judgments (including judgments about what to do) rather than also 
including contexts involving primarily negotiations (e.g., over who should walk the dog).  
 There are several lessons that we take from the debate that are relevant to our educational 
project. One relates to the importance of the confrontation of conflicting views and of critique. 
Another centres on the risks of aggressivity, of the focus on winning, and of polarization. What 
is required, then, is an approach which involves the confrontation of opposing views but at the 
same time fosters a critical but fair-minded consideration of these views. We propose dialectical 
inquiry, with its use of collaborative oppositionality, as such an approach. 
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